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Abstract
We study the nature of firm pay dynamics using matched employer-employee data from Swe-
den, including rich, administrative firm financial data. To this end, we propose and estimate
a statistical model that extends the seminal framework by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis
(1999a, henceforth AKM) to flexibly account for time-varying firm pay policies. We validate
our approach by showing that firm-year pay variation is systematically related to firm finan-
cial performance. Subsequently, we apply our methodology to assess the role of firm pay dy-
namics in accounting for a rise in earnings inequality in Sweden, to investigate the properties
of the distribution of within-firm pay differences over time, to measure the degree of firm pay
mobility, and to quantify the relative contribution of ex-ante versus ex-post heterogeneity to-
wards firm pay differences over the firm life cycle. We conclude that no more than two thirds
of firm pay heterogeneity are permanent, with persistent and transitory fluctuations in firm
pay constituting the remainder.
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1 Introduction
A burgeoning literature studies the role of firms in accounting for worker-level labor market out-
comes, in particular for the distribution of pay.1 Much of this literature builds on the seminal
framework by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999a, henceforth AKM), which controls for both
worker and firm fixed effects (henceforth FEs) among other covariates. A great strength of this
framework is that it allows one to simultaneously account for unobserved but time-invariant
worker and firm heterogeneity in pay. However, a strong assumption underlying this frame-
work is that firm pay is constant over arbitrarily long time horizons. In sharp contrast, canonical
models of firm dynamics postulate that firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., Hopenhayn,
1992) and the empirical evidence confirms that worker-firm rent sharing responds to such shocks
(e.g., Guiso et al., 2005). This raises a sequence of important questions: How dynamic is firm pay?
Why do firms adjust their pay over time? And what are the implications of firm pay dynamics for
short-run versus long-run pay inequality?
In pursuit of answers to these questions, we develop a new empirical framework that controls
for idiosyncratically time-varying firmpay policies. We estimate and validate the framework on 30
years of detailed matched employer-employee data from Sweden and use it to study the nature of
firm pay dynamics. Our results suggest that there is substantial variation in firm-year pay (relative
to a model with fixed firm pay policies), that trends in incumbent firm pay policies explain a large
rise in pay inequality in Sweden over the past decades, and that there is significant mean reversion
in firm pay resulting in sizable firm pay mobility at various time horizons. Altogether our results
highlight the importance of modeling firm pay as a dynamic object.
To study firm pay dynamics, we extend the seminal framework by AKM to allow for idiosyn-
cratically time-varying firm pay policies via a set of fully flexible firm-year FEs. We show that,
analogous to the usual notion of a connected set (Abowd et al., 2002), the firm-year FE model is
identified for a set of firms and workers that are linked through worker transitions between firm-
years.2 To quantify the importance of firm-year pay policies, we estimate a sequence of firm-year
1See Card et al. (2018) for a recent overview of this literature. Notably, Card et al. (2013b) argue that increasing
dispersion in pay across firms accounts for a significant share of the overall trend of increasing wage inequality in
Germany, and Alvarez et al. (2018) find that a compression in firm pay was an important factor behind a large decline
in earnings inequality in Brazil over the past decades.
2While, in theory, the largest connected set in our firm-year FE model and that in the AKM firm FE model are
not congruent, we find that in practice they are virtually identical and cover close to the entire set of worker-year
observations.
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FE specifications with increasingly higher minimum firm size thresholds on the Swedish linked
employer-employee data from 1986–2015. Variation in firm-year pay policies explain a signifi-
cant share of the overall variance in log monthly earnings, ranging from 18 to 10 percent across
specifications. The correlation between the estimated firm-year and worker components of pay
ranges from 1 to 13 percent across specifications. Moreover, as we increase the minimum firm
size threshold across specifications, we find a gradually lower variance of the estimated firm-year
component of pay and a gradually higher correlation between firm-year and worker components
of pay, consistent with the presence of limited-mobility bias in the population data (Andrews et al.,
2008). However, the variance components and the worker/firm-year correlation stabilize around
a minimum firm size threshold of 10 workers.
To validate our empirical approach, we document that our firm-year FE estimates are strongly
positively correlated with firm financial performance, such as firm-level productivity measured
by value added per worker, sales per worker, firm size, and assets per worker. Within-firm differ-
ences in firm-year FEs also covary positively with firm financials. Finally, the estimated firm-year
effects are closely related, but far from identical, to a set of AKM firm FEs and raw firm-level
mean earnings. Together, these observations give us confidence in the validity of our proposed
framework.
After successfully validating our empirical approach, we proceed to exploit the strengths of
our framework in various applications related to firm pay dynamics. We first dissect secular
trends in firm pay inequality in Sweden over the past 30 years. We document that dispersion in
firm pay has increased over this period, mirroring trends in, for instance, Germany (Card et al.,
2013b) and the US (Song et al., 2018). We find that a large share of this increase is due to changes in
the distribution of firm pay policies as proxied by the distribution of firm-year FEs. The increase
in firm pay inequality has been particularly pronounced in the right tail of the distribution of
firm pay and a large share of the increase has taken place among incumbent firms. Importantly,
a framework with firm FEs, like the original work by AKM and follow-up work including Card
et al. (2013b) and Song et al. (2018), would have been unable to attribute this increase in firm pay
inequality to the changing behavior of incumbent firms, since that framework by construction
rules out any within-firm differences in firm FEs.
We proceed to dissect the distribution of firm pay changes, exploiting the large scale and
long panel of our data. The distribution of firm pay changes displays excess kurtosis, mirror-
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ing individual-level earnings changes. In other words, the tails of the distribution of firm pay
changes has more mass in the tails relative to a normal distribution. From the perspective of a
risk-averse worker, the standard deviation of firm pay changes hence fails to fully reflect the wel-
fare consequences of firm pay dynamics.
Next, we show that the distribution of firm-year FEs at new firms is lower on average, more
dispersed, and more left-skewed than that at all firms in the population. Furthermore, there are
some substantial fluctuations in initial firm pay across cohorts of firms. We find that pay at start-
ups is relatively more sensitive to the business cycle, rising by more than that of incumbents dur-
ing expansions and falling by more during recessions. For example, the cyclical component of
new firms’ pay (relative to that of all firms) extracted using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter at an-
nual frequency has a correlation of 35 percent with the negative of the unemployment rate.
Finally, to quantify the relative importance of permanent differences versus persistent and
transitory fluctuations in firm pay, we borrow from the literature on individual earnings dynam-
ics to study the structure of the autocovariance structure of firm pay (MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and
Card, 1989; Sterk et al., 2018). Partly consistent with the AKM firm FE approach, we find that in
an unbalanced panel of firms permanent firm pay heterogeneity plays a quantitatively important
role, accounting for 62 percent of the long-run variance of firm-year FEs. A persistent AR(1) com-
ponent accounts for another 31 percent, with an estimated annual autocorrelation of 67 percent.
The remaining 7 percent of the long-run variance in firm-year FEs is due to independent and iden-
tically distributed (iid) transitory fluctuations. We conclude that while firm pay is persistent, there
is a quantitatively important dynamic component of firm pay.
Altogether, our findings suggest that firm pay dynamics are both statistically and economically
meaningful and that firms play an important role in the transmission of both idiosyncratic firm-
level and aggregate shocks to worker-level outcomes, in particular pay.
Related literature. With the new availability of administrative linked employer-employee datasets,
a large empirical literature has studied the determinants of worker and firm heterogeneity in wage
determination. The econometric framework commonly employed in this literature is the semi-
nal two-way FEs model by AKM, which identifies worker and firm FEs separately from workers
switching employers over time. Many studies have built on this framework and highlighted the
importance of firm FEs in explaining both cross-sectional patterns of wage dispersion and time
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trends in wage dispersion. To study cross-sectional wage dispersion, an econometrician would
commonly estimate the AKMmodel within a fixed time window (Abowd et al., 1999b, 2002; Card
et al., 2018; Sorkin, 2018). To study time trends in wage dispersion, an econometrician would
commonly estimate the AKM model within rolling time windows and compare cross-sectional
estimates across time windows (Card et al., 2013b; Song et al., 2018; Alvarez et al., 2018).
While this literature has delivered insights of great importance, it has at least two salient lim-
itations. First, firm pay policies are assumed to be fixed within a given time window. Second,
to the extent that firm pay policies change between consecutive time windows among incumbent
firms, the empirical model is almost certainly misspecified and silent on how these changes come
about. We fill this gap by proposing a more flexible empirical model that allows for idiosyncrati-
cally time-varying firm pay policies, which we capture through a set of firm-year FEs. Allowing
for time-varying firm pay policies allows us to measure fluctuations in firm pay at all frequencies
within a single estimation time window.
To allow for firm-specific fluctuations in pay seems natural in light of a large parallel litera-
ture studying the pass-through of firm-level shocks to worker-level outcomes (Van Reenen, 1996;
Guiso et al., 2005; Lemieux et al., 2009; Card et al., 2013a; Kline et al., 2019a; Garin and Silvério,
2019; Kehrig and Vincent, 2019; Chan et al., 2019; Moser et al., 2019). Much of this literature is con-
cernedwith estimating rent-sharing elasticities for incumbent workers who remain employed. Re-
cent exceptions include Lamadon (2016) and Friedrich et al. (2019), who explicitly model worker
mobility between firms. Relative to previous work, our empirical approach has the advantage
that, first, we do not need to take a stance on the sources of the fluctuations in firm pay and,
second, we obtain worker selection-corrected estimates of firm pay that does not depend on the
pattern of stayers versus switchers across firms.
In contemporaneous work, Lachowska et al. (2019) develop a similar framework for estimating
firm-year pay heterogeneity subject to leave-one-out bias correction based on a method by Kline
et al. (2019b), which they apply to data from the US state of Washington. Our works share the
application of such a framework to study time trends in firm pay. Notable aspects that distinguish
our work from theirs include our use of detailed firm financials data, our study of various mo-
ments of the distribution of within-firm pay differences, our exploration of firm pay mobility, and
our focus on ex-ante versus ex-post firm pay heterogeneity. These are examples of the important
issues that our framework can help address, which to the best of our knowledge have not been
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previously explored.
Our empirical findings also help discipline a new generation of structural models of firm het-
erogeneity in the labor market. While, traditionally, a large class of models have assumed that
firm (pay) heterogeneity is fixed (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Bagger and Lentz, 2018; Engbom
and Moser, 2018), a new generation of models allows for rich idiosyncratic dynamics in firm pay
(Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2012; Lise and Robin, 2017; Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2018; Bilal
et al., 2019; Elsby and Gottfries, 2019). These models are at times silent about the nature of wage
setting, since only the value or surplus of a match is theoretically pinned down. Our rich set of
empirical facts on firm pay dynamics can help discipline the wage setting side of these models,
which is of great interest for further structural work related to the wage distribution.
Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes and summarizes the
linked employer-employee records and firm financials data from Sweden. Section 3 introduces
the firm-year FE model, discusses identification, presents a variance decomposition for the es-
timated model, and validates the model findings with regards to alternative firm pay measures
and observable firm financials. Section 4 explores various dimensions of firm pay dynamics. It
dissects the distribution of firm pay over time, and studies various moments of the distribution
of within-firm pay differences, documents patterns of firm pay mobility. It also analyzes the rel-
ative importance of ex-ante versus ex-post firm pay heterogeneity, including the distribution of
firm pay at firm entry and a statistical decomposition of the long-run variance of firm pay into
permanent, persistent, and transitory components. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
In this section, we describe our data sources, discuss variable construction and sample selection,
and present summary statistics.
2.1 Data Sources and Variable Definitions
To study worker and firm pay dynamics, we analyze rich linked employer-employee data cov-
ering the universe of workers and firms in Sweden.3 Specifically, we combine data from three
3These data have some advantages over comparable data available in the U.S. and most other countries. Notably,
they contain information on the characteristics of essentially all workers, firms, and jobs in the economy.
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sources. First, we draw worker demographics data from the Registerbaserad Arbetsmarknadsstatis-
tik (RAMS). Second, we use employment register data from the Longitudinell Integrationsdatabas
för Sjukförsäkrings- och Arbetsmarknadsstudier (LISA). Third, we obtain firm financials data from
the Företagens Ekonomi (FEK). These data are originally reported to Swedish government agencies
and subsequently consolidated by the Swedish statistical agency, Statistiska Centralbyrån (SCB), to
make them available in anonymized form to approved researchers. We describe the three datasets
in detail in Appendix A.1.
2.2 Sample Selection
We focus on private sector employees age 18–64 between 1997 and 2015. We limit attention to
these years since we have close-to-complete coverage of income and balance sheet information for
private sector firms during this period. We further restrict attention to each worker’s main em-
ployment spell in every year, which we select by choosing the employment spell with the highest
annual earnings.
2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the data. In total, the merged dataset comprises over 18 million individual-
year observations. Mean monthly earnings are 10.25 log SEK, which corresponds to around 3,000
USD. The average worker is just below 40 years old and earns 10.25 log SEK (SEK 28,282 or USD
2,938) per month. Around 21 percent of workers hold a higher-education degree. The average
firm employs 1,420 workers, is a little over 19 years old, has SEK 4.60 billion in sales, SEK 1.28
billion in value added, SEK 5.48 billion in assets, SEK 2.61 billion in debt (and hence SEK 2.87
billion in equity), and invests SEK 0.13 billion on average.
3 Measuring Firm-Year Pay Heterogeneity
In this section, we introduce an empirical model of firm pay dynamics. Building on the seminal
framework by AKM, our goal is to estimate dynamic firm pay heterogeneity while simultaneously
controlling for permanent (unobserved) worker heterogeneity.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Mean Std. dev.
Panel A. Worker-level variables
Worker age (years) 39.62 11.10
Share with college degree 0.213
Monthly earnings (log SEK) 10.25 0.48
Panel B. Firm-level variables
Firm size (thousands of employees) 1.42 3.05
Firm age (years) 19.20 8.37
Sales (billion SEK) 4.60 10.45
Value added (billion SEK) 1.28 4.13
Assets (billion SEK) 5.48 2.34
Debt (billion SEK) 2.61 9.19
Equity (billion SEK) 2.87 10.84
Investment (billion SEK) 0.13 0.53
Observations 18,412,038
Note: All monetary variables are in constant 2014 SEK. The number of observations is the number of worker-years. Source: LISA,
RAMS, FEK.
3.1 The Firm-Year Fixed Effects Model
We posit the following firm-year FEs model for pay of individual i employed at firm j in year t:
yijt = αi + ψjt + γt + Xitβ + ε ijt, (1)
where yijt is log earnings, αi is a worker fixed effect, ψjt is a firm-year fixed effect restricted to have
population mean zero in each year, γt is a year fixed effect, Xit is a set of time-varying worker
controls, and ε ijt is an error term.
Our object of interest in equation (1) are the firm-year FEs, ψjt, which we interpret as firm pay
policies. Such firm pay policies take the form of proportional relative pay premia for workers at a
given physical firm in a given year. The simple but important difference between this specification
and the original AKM specification is that equation (1) allows for time-varying firm-year FEs, ψjt.
In contrast, AKM and a vast follow-up literature restricts attention to time-invariant firm FEs, ψj.
Pay policies may be heterogeneous across firms due to labor market frictions or deviations from
the perfect-labor-markets benchmark (Engbom and Moser, 2018), the presence of compensating
differentials (Rosen, 1986), or both (Morchio and Moser, 2019). Pay policies may change idiosyn-
cratically due to pass-through of firm-level productivity shocks (Guiso et al., 2005), changes in
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firm financial conditions (Moser et al., 2019), or firm life-cycle dynamics (Babina et al., 2019).
The inclusion of worker FEs, αi, in equation (1) allows us to separately control for permanent
worker heterogeneity, including unobservable ability differences. Accounting for worker hetero-
geneity has proven to be of first-order importance in a number of contexts, including labor mar-
kets where heterogeneous workers are not randomly or uniformly allocated across firms (Card
et al., 2013b; Song et al., 2018). In our context, these controls are crucial because without them
it would be impossible to tell apart changes in workforce composition in terms of unobservable
time-invariant worker characteristics from changes in firm pay policies.
The specification in equation (1) also controls for standard time-varying observable worker
characteristics, Xit, including a restricted set of education-specific age dummies. Due to the well-
known problem of collinearity between age, cohort, and time, it is not feasible to include unre-
stricted age dummies or a linear term in age. Following the argument in Card et al. (2018), we
normalize age dummies to be constant between ages 50 to 64 based on the raw earnings profile
being approximately flat around those ages.4
Finally, ε ijt is an error term satisfying the usual strict exogeneity condition: E[ε ijt|i, jt, t,Xit] =
0. As shown by Card et al. (2013b), a sufficient condition for this to hold is that the assignment
of workers across (young and old) firms obeys a strict exogeneity condition with respect to ε ijt:
P
[
J (i, t) = j| ε ijt
]
= P [J (i, t) = j] for all i and t. This assumption is consistent with worker mo-
bility based on worker identity and the identity of all (past, present, and future) firm-years in the
economy. However, as in the original AKMmodel, it rules out mobility based on the residual ε ijt.
To relate our firm-year FEs model to the original firm FEs model by AKM, note that both mod-
els are special cases of a generalized firm-set-of-years FEs model. Formally, let firms be indexed
by j ∈ J and let years be indexed by t ∈ T . Fix a partition P = {Pk}k=1,...,NP of cardinality NP ≥ 1
of the set of years T .5 Now consider the analogue of the regression model in equation (1) but with
a firm-set-of-years fixed effect ψjP for each firm j ∈ J and set of years P ∈ P . This model reduces
to the firm FEs model by AKM if P = {T } with NP = 1, while it reduces to our firm-year FEs
model if P = T with NP = |T |. An advantage of the firm-year FEs model over the AKM model
is that the former reduces to the latter if in reality firm pay policies are time invariant. Conversely,
the AKMmodel is misspecified if true firm pay policies are time varying.6
4Alternatively, one could include higher-order (second and above) age polynomial terms as in Card et al. (2013b).
5That is, Pk ⊆ T ∀k, Pk 6= ∅ ∀k,
⋃
k=1,...,NP Pk = T , and Pk ∩ Pk′ = ∅ for any 1 ≤ k < k
′ ≤ NP.
6Another popular approach in the literature is a rolling time window model (Card et al., 2013b; Alvarez et al.,
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3.2 Identification
Identification of the firm-year FEs model proceeds analogously to that of the AKM model. The
only material difference is that the notion of “physical firms” in the AKM model is replaced with
“firm-years” in the firm-year FEs model. To see this, it will be useful to revisit the definition of
connectedness first in the context of the two-way effects model by AKM and then in the context of
our firm-year FEs model.7
We first recall the notion of a connected set in the context of the AKM firm FEs model. Identi-
fication of the firm FEs model by AKM is obtained within connected sets of observations, where
connections are formed through worker mobility across physical firms (Abowd et al., 2002). Phys-
ical firms can exist for multiple years, connected sets are defined by switches between physical
firms, and workers moving between physical firms constitute switches. Firm FEs within a con-
nected set are relative to the fixed effect of one normalized physical firm. Intuitively, conditional
changes in pay as workers switch physical firms identify relative firm pay policies.
We now transpose the notion of a connected set to our firm-year FEs model. Identification
of the firm-year FEs framework is obtained within connected sets, where connections are formed
through worker mobility across firm-years. Physical firms switch identity each year, connected
sets are defined by switches across firm-years, and repeat worker observations (including stayers
at physical firms) constitute switches. Firm-year FEs within a connected set are relative to the
fixed effect of one normalized firm-year. Intuitively, conditional changes in pay as workers switch
firm-years identify relative firm pay policies.
Figure 1 illustrates identification of connected sets in the firm-year FEsmodel with two periods
(indexed t = 1, 2) and two firms (indexed A and B) with two employees each (shown as circles).
If all workers stay at their original employer, as in panel (a), then two connected sets are formed,
one around each physical firm over time. In contrast, if some, but not all, workers switch across
physical firms, as in panel (b), the connected set spans both physical firms.
2018; Lachowska et al., 2019), which repeatedly estimates firm FEs models within overlapping periods. A potential
advantage of the rolling time window approach is that, in principal, it allows for time-varying unobserved worker
heterogeneity. However, one of its disadvantages is that, to the extent that one observes within-firm (within-worker)
variation in estimated firm (worker) FEs across time windows, the model is generally misspecified.
7Further details and formal definitions of connectedness are contained in Appendix B.1.
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Figure 1. Illustrating identification of the connected set(s)
(a) Two connected sets
t = 1 t = 2
Connected set 1
Connected set 2
Firm A
(t = 1)
Firm B
(t = 1)
Firm A
(t = 2)
Firm B
(t = 2)
(b) One connected set
t = 1 t = 2
Connected set
Firm A
(t = 1)
Firm B
(t = 1)
Firm A
(t = 2)
Firm B
(t = 2)
Note: Solid rectangles represent firm-years, with firm A in blue and firm B in orange. Solid and hollow circles represent workers,
with worker 1 in solid blue, worker 2 in hollow blue, worker 3 in solid orange, and worker 4 in hollow orange. Vertical dashed lines
represent time, with period t = 1 to the left and period t = 2 to the right. Solid arrows represent worker transitions across firm-years.
Dashed rectangles represent the connected set(s) formed by worker transitions across firm-years.
3.3 Variance Decompositions
Based on our estimate of equation (1) via ordinary least squares (OLS) for workers in the largest
connected set, we implement a popular variance decomposition (Abowd et al., 1999a; Card et al.,
2013b, 2016; Alvarez et al., 2018; Sorkin, 2018; Song et al., 2018). Specifically, we decompose the
variance of log earnings into components due to permanent worker heterogeneity, firm-year het-
erogeneity, the aggregate state, time-varying worker characteristics, covariance terms or sorting,
and the residual:
Var
(
yijt
)
= Var (α̂i) +Var
(
ψ̂jt
)
+Var (γ̂t) +Var
(
Xit β̂
)
+ 2∑Cov (·) +Var
(
ε̂ ijt
)
(2)
Results of the variance decomposition in equation (2) are presented in Table 2. To address concerns
about limited-mobility bias affecting the second moments of fixed effect estimates (Abowd et al.,
2004; Andrews et al., 2008, 2012; Kline et al., 2019b), we present results for different minimum firm
size cutoffs between 1 and 100 in columns (1)–(5).
Our main result is that estimated firm-year effects account for between 4.4 log points (19 per-
cent) and 1.9 log points (8 percent) of the total variance of log earnings, with decreasing levels
(shares) for higher minimum firm size cutoffs. The covariance terms, primarily due to the covari-
ance between estimated worker effects and firm-year effects, account for between 0.0 log points
(0 percent) and 1.8 log points (8 percent) of the total variance of log earnings, with corresponding
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correlation ranging from 0.011 to 0.127. Compared to a variance decomposition based on the tra-
ditional AKM specification with firm FEs—see Table 6 of Appendix B.2—firm-year effects account
for up to 1.2 log points (up to 46 percent) more of the variance in log earnings.
The contribution in levels and shares of the variance of firm-year effects toward the total vari-
ance of log earnings is decreasing over the range of very small firm size cutoffs. This is consistent
with the presence of limited-mobility bias (Abowd et al., 2004; Andrews et al., 2008, 2012) lead-
ing to biased quadratic forms, specifically a downward-biased correlation between worker and
firm-year effects (Kline et al., 2019b). Such incidental parameter problems are particularly likely
to arise in our firm-year effects model, which features a greater number of parameters compared
to the traditional AKM model. Alleviating these concerns, we find that both the level and share
of the variance of firm-year effects as well as the correlation between worker and firm-year effects
stabilize around a minimum firm size threshold of 10 employees. This gives us confidence that the
incidental-parameters problem is less binding and estimation results are reliable for a minimum
firm size cutoff of 10 or more employees.
Finally, it is worth noting that the connected set of workers in our firm-year effects model spans
between 98 and 100 percent of worker-years, similar to results for the traditional AKMmodel.
Table 2. Variance decomposition based on levels of firm-year FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Var
(
yijt
)
0.235 0.230 0.231 0.234 0.235
Var (α̂i) 0.124 0.121 0.125 0.130 0.132
Var
(
ψ̂jt
)
0.044 0.028 0.022 0.019 0.019
Var
(
Xit β̂
)
0.025 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.019
2×∑Cov (·) 0.000 0.011 0.016 0.018 0.018
Var
(
ε̂ ijt
)
0.044 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.047
Corr
(
α̂i, ψ̂jt
)
0.011 0.094 0.124 0.129 0.127
Observations 21,145,007 18,425,427 15,091,142 11,313,701 9,392,584
Unique workers 3,056,376 2,801,551 2,437,724 1,959,034 1,685,029
Unique firms 2,134,700 628,190 202,346 51,833 23,761
Largest connected set 98.1% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
R2 0.814 0.799 0.798 0.801 0.802
Firm FE type Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year
Income concept Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Minimum firm size 1 5 15 50 100
Note: Variance decomposition is based on earnings equation (2): yijt = αi + ψjt + γt + Xitβ + εijt. The resulting variance decom-
position is Var(yijt) = Var(α̂i) + Var(ψ̂jt) + Var(γt) + Var(Xit β̂) + 2∑Cov(·) + Var(ε̂ijt). Largest connected set is stated in terms of
the fraction of worker-years. Source: LISA, RAMS.
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3.4 Comparing firm pay measures
It will be useful to compare estimates of firm-year FEs in our model to alternative firm pay mea-
sures. To this end, Figure 2 compares different moments of the distribution of firm-year FEs and
firm FEs, respectively, against corresponding firm-level mean earnings in the raw data.
Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows that mean firm FEs and mean firm-year FEs are highly correlated.8
Both have a slope with regards to firm-level mean earnings of less than one, indicating that there
is positive assortative matching between worker types and firm types that explains some of the
dispersion in firm-level mean earnings. Finally, firm-year FEs are significantly more increasing
in firm-level mean earnings compared to firm FEs, indicating that yearly variation in firm pay is
picked up by the firm-year FEs specification but not by the firm FEs specification.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows that there is sizable dispersion in both firm FEs and firm-year
FEs conditional on firm-level mean earnings, which is suggestive of heterogeneity in the com-
position of worker types across firms with similar pay. All three moments—the 10th, 50th, and
90th percentiles—of the conditional firm FEs distribution and the conditional firm-year FEs dis-
tribution are essentially monotonically increasing in firm-level mean earnings. Finally, dispersion
in firm-year FEs conditional on firm-level mean earnings, relative to that of firm FEs, is slightly
higher, particularly in the tails of the distribution of firm-level mean earnings.
Figure 2. Comparison between firm FEs, firm-year FEs, and firm-level mean earnings
(a) Means
Firm FEs slope (s.e.) = 0.432 (0.006)
Firm-year FEs slope (s.e.) = 0.523 (0.006)
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Note: Figure shows binned scatter plots of mean firm pay measures with linear best fit lines (panel (a)) and of various percentiles
of the conditional distribution of firm pay measures (panel (b)) as a function of mean firm-level earnings bins. Source: LISA, RAMS.
8In a projection of firm FEs on firm-year FEs, we find an estimated slope coefficient of 0.751 and standard error of
0.012—see Figure 16 in Appendix B.4. Conversely, in a projection of firm-year FEs on firm FEs, we find a result similar
to that by Lachowska et al. (2019) of an estimated slope coefficient that is indistinguishable from unity, with a point
estimate of 1.009 and standard error of 0.005—see Figure 17 in Appendix B.4.
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3.5 Determinants of Firm-Year Pay
Why do firms pay differently in the cross section? What leads them to change pay policies over
time? To answer these questions, we follow the two-stagemethodology in Alvarez et al. (2018) and
project estimated firm-year FEs from equation (1) onto observable firm characteristics.9 Specifi-
cally, we estimate the following worker-weighted second-stage regression for firm j in year t:
ψ̂jt = Zjtδ + ηjt, (3)
where ψ̂jt is the estimated first-stage firm-year fixed effect, Zjt is a vector of observable firm char-
acteristics (possibly including a firm-specific constant), and ηjt is a firm-level error term.
Determinants of firm pay in the cross section. Figure 3 presents a first glance at the bivariate
relationship between our estimated firm-year FEs and key firm financial indicators: value added
per worker in panel (a), sales per worker in panel (b), firm size in panel (c), and assets per worker
in panel (d). In many theories of the labor market, these firm variables are strongly tied to firm
pay. We find a visually strong relationship between each of these characteristics and our estimated
firm-year FEs, lending cross-sectional support to the interpretation of ψjt as a firm pay policy.10
Building on the second-stage regression in equation (3), we formalize this visual evidence in
Table 3, which presents both univariate correlation coefficients including year FEs in column (1)
and also multivariate regression coefficients from a regression including all available firm charac-
teristics simultaneously in the same specification in column (2). The univariate results in column
(1) show confirm the results of our visual analysis. The multivariate results in column (2) show
that among all available firm characteristics, firm-year FEs have the highest estimated elasticity
with respect to value added per worker, followed by debt per worker (possibly a proxy for past
investments), assets per worker, and sales per worker. The R2 of the multivariate regression is
0.385, suggesting that a relatively sparse set of firm characteristics explains a substantial fraction
of firm-year pay variation.
9In Appendix B.3, we conduct the parallel exercise of projecting estimated worker FEs from our augmented AKM
equation (1) onto observable worker characteristics.
10Similar relationships between AKM FEs and firm characteristics have been found in previous work by Barth et al.
(2016), Card et al. (2016), and Alvarez et al. (2018).
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Figure 3. Second stage results: Estimated firm pay versus firm characteristics
(a) Value added per worker
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Note: Figure shows binscatter plot with linear best fit lines for firm-year FEs as a function of value added per worker in panel (a),
sales per worker in panel (b), firm size in panel (c), and assets per worker in panel (d). Source: LISA, RAMS, FEK.
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Table 3. Second stage results: Regression analysis of firm pay versus firm characteristics
(1) (2)
Univariate Multivariate
Firm size (log employees) 0.023 0.008
Firm age (years) 0.035 -0.002
Sales per worker (log SEK) 0.070 0.013
Value added per worker (log SEK) 0.121 0.056
Assets per worker (log SEK) 0.056 0.014
Debt per worker (log SEK) 0.056 0.018
Equity per worker (log SEK) 0.036 0.004
Investment per worker (log SEK) 0.022 -0.004
Observations 13,865,483 13,865,483
R2 0.385
Year FE Yes Yes
Note: Table shows second-stage regressions based on equation (3). Column (1) shows results of univariate regressions with
only one explanatory variable at a time. Column (2) shows results of a multivariate regression that simultaneously includes all firm
characteristics. All results are significant at the 1% level. Source: LISA, RAMS, FEK.
Determinants of firm pay dynamics. A growing literature has highlighted the role of employers
in imperfectly insuring their workers against productivity shocks (Van Reenen, 1996; Guiso et al.,
2005; Lemieux et al., 2009; Lamadon, 2016; Friedrich et al., 2019; Kline et al., 2019a). To shed light
on the determinants of firm pay dynamics, we use the detailed firm financials data available in
the FEK dataset from 2003 onwards. Figure 4 plots the relationship between differences at various
lag lengths in value added per worker, sales per worker, firm size, and assets per worker on the
horizontal axis against changes in firm pay on the vertical axis.
Evidently, firms that become more productive increase pay, while firms that become less pro-
ductive leave pay unchanged. The latter may be consistent with real price rigidities (recall that we
are using real wages). As the time horizon increases, the pattern becomes more pronounced (and
the kink around zero gradually disappears). This pattern would, for instance, be consistent with
productivity shocks having a permanent and transitory component, and firms primarily adjusting
pay in response to the permanent component. As the time horizon lengthens, more weight is ef-
fectively put on the permanent component, which accounts for themore pronounced link between
changes in firm pay and productivity.
We also link changes in firm pay to changes in other firm observables. As for productivity,
firms that receive positive shocks to sales per worker or assets per worker increase pay, with the
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patterns again becomingmore pronounced as the time horizon rises. The comovement of firm pay
and size, however, is not particularly pronounced. The fact that firm pay dynamics are related to
firm productivity dynamics suggests that the mean reversion observed in Figure 4 is not just the
result of measurement error in the firm component of pay, but reflects a more fundamental link
between firm performance and pay.
Figure 4. Change in firm pay versus change in other firm observables
(a) Value added per worker
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Note: Figure shows binned scatter plot with linear best fit lines for differenced firm-year FEs as a function of value added per
worker in panel (a), sales per worker in panel (b), firm size in panel (c), and assets per worker in panel (d). Differences are taken at lag
lengths of 1 year (red circles), 3 years (green diamonds), 5 years (orange triangles), and 10 years (pink squares). Source: LISA, RAMS,
FEK.
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4 Firm Pay Dynamics
In this section, we empirically study the nature of firm pay dynamics. Specifically, we investigate
the firm pay distribution over time, the distribution of changes in firm pay, firm pay mobility,
and ex-ante versus ex-post firm pay heterogeneity. To analyze firm pay dynamics, unless noted
otherwise, we focus on an unbalanced and employment-weighted panel of firms that fall above a
minimum firm size threshold of 10 employees, consistent with our preferred firm-year FEs speci-
fication from Section 3.3.
4.1 Firm Pay Distribution over Time
We document significant between-firm pay differences initially and an increase therein over time
for Sweden between 1986 and 2015. Figure 5 plots the evolution of various percentiles of the firm-
level mean earnings distribution. Panel (a) shows percentile levels, with differences in average
firm-level pay of 64 log points between the P95 and the P5 of the firm pay distribution in 1986.
Turning to the normalized percentile evolution in panel (b), there has been a substantial increase
in the dispersion of firm-year FEs over time, with the P95 growing by 15 log points but the P5
declining by 9 log points.
Figure 5. Evolution of firm-level mean earnings, 1986–2015
(a) Percentiles
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(b) Normalized percentiles
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Note: Figure shows various percentiles of the distribution of firm-level mean log earnings in levels (panel (a)) and relative to the
year 1986 (panel (b)) for an unbalanced and employment-weighted panel of firms. Source: LISA, RAMS.
How much of the observed divergence in the firm-level mean earnings distribution is ac-
counted for by changes in firm pay policies, as opposed to changes in worker composition? Figure
18
6 plots the evolution of various percentiles of the firm-year FE distribution. Initial dispersion in
firm-year FEs is lower than that of raw firm-level mean earnings, indicating that high paid work-
ers tend towork for high paying firms. Moreover, the dispersion of firm-year FEs increases rapidly
between 1986 and 2015, driven by the top of the firm pay distribution. For example, the P95 grows
by 12 log points but the P5 declines by 6 log points over the period 1986–2015.
Figure 6. Evolution of firm-year FEs, 1986–2015
(a) Percentiles
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(b) Normalized percentiles
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Note: Figure shows various percentiles of the distribution of firm-year FEs in levels (panel (a)) and relative to the year 1986 (panel
(b)) for an unbalanced and employment-weighted panel of firms. Source: LISA, RAMS.
To show that this trend is not driven purely by worker reallocation and firm selection, Ap-
pendix C.1 repeats the same graph for an unbalanced and unweighted panel (i.e., controlling for
worker reallocation, see Figure 18), for a balanced and weighted panel (i.e., controlling for firm
selection, see Figure 19), and for a balanced and unweighted panel (i.e., controlling for both the
allocation of workers and firm selection, see Figure 20), respectively. While worker reallocation
and firm selection play an important role, there have been significant changes in firm pay policies
behind the trends documented in Figures 5 and 6. To see this, note that even the balanced and
unweighted panel of firm pay (Figure 20) shows a strong divergence of firm pay over time, with
the P95 growing by 11 log points but the P5 declining by 2 log points over the period 1986–2015.
We conclude that firm pay policies are important for understanding between-firm pay differ-
ences, that firm pay dynamics are important for understanding the evolution of earnings inequal-
ity in Sweden over the last three decades, and that incumbent firm pay dynamics are a significant
driver behind these trends.
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4.2 Distribution of Within-Firm Differences in Firm Pay
To illustrate that firm pay changes importantly within firms over time, Figure 7 shows the distri-
bution of within-firm differences in firm-year FEs at various lag lengths between 1 and 25 years
for a balanced and employment-weighted panel of firms.11
The density of 1-year differences in firm-year FEs is centered just below zero (mean of -0.013),
is very concentrated (variance of 0.002), has a relatively thicker right tail (skewness of 1.244), and
has thick tails (kurtosis of 37.503).12At higher lag lengths, we observe a significantly higher mean,
lower skewness, and lower kurtosis of the distribution of differences in firm-year FEs relative to
that for shorter lag lengths. For example, for a 25-year lag, firms on average increase their pay by
5.9 log points, with associated variance of 0.025, skewness of 0.312, and kurtosis of 4.830.13
Figure 7. Distribution of firm-year FE differences at various lag lengths
(a) Density
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(b) Moments
Lag length Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis
1 -0.013 0.002 1.244 37.504
5 0.014 0.006 -0.380 13.733
10 0.024 0.010 0.209 7.962
25 0.059 0.025 0.312 4.830
Note: Figure shows nonparametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the distribution of the within-firm changes in firm-
year FEs at various lag lengths in panel (a) and moments of the distribution at various lag lengths in panel (b). Source: LISA, RAMS.
These findings suggests that there are both transitory and permanent parts to a firm’s pay
policy. On one hand, if firm pay was perfectly persistent, we would see a degenerate distribution
of differences in firm-year FEs at all lag lengths. On the other hand, if firm pay was perfectly
transitory or due to iid measurement error, the distribution of differences in firm-year FEs would
be invariant to the lag length. In contrast, our findings indicate that, over time, incumbent firms
11Using a balanced panel for differences at various lag lengths allows us to control for firm selection. For this exercise,
we construct weights as the average employment of a given firm between two periods.
12We remind the reader that we de-meaned firm-year fixed effects at the population level every year and that here
we study a subsample of firms in a balanced panel. Therefore, negative mean firm-year pay differences in the balanced
panel do not necessarily reflect negative raw earnings growth.
13Large positive long-run differences in firm-year pay can be reconciled with negative short-run differences in firm-
year pay by reallocation of workers between firms with declining versus increasing pay.
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change their pay more positively with greater variance but lower skewness and kurtosis to the
firm pay differences.
The use of firm-year FEs paints a picture that is slightly different in interesting ways compared
to just looking at raw firm-level mean earnings. To put our results in context and highlight the
value of ourmethodology, Figure 21 in Appendix C.2 shows the same statistics without controlling
for changes in worker composition based on unobservable worker characteristics. Compared to
the raw measure of firm-level mean earnings, our firm-year FE methodology reveals that mean
changes in firm pay policies are more negative, less dispersed, less (more) positively skewed at
shorter (longer) lag lengths, and of lower (higher) kurtosis at shorter (longer) lag lengths.
4.3 Firm Pay Mobility
The transitory versus permanent aspects of firm pay are intimately related to the concept of in-
come mobility (Shorrocks, 1978; Kopczuk et al., 2010; Black and Devereux, 2011). Conceptually,
the degree of mobility in firm pay relates the cross-sectional distribution of firm pay (“short-run
inequality”) to the distribution of period-average firm pay (“long-run inequality”). In a world
with zero mobility, firms have a constant pay policy, as estimated in the classical AKM frame-
work. In contrast, in a world with full mobility each firm’s current pay policy is independent of
its future pay policies.
To illustrate the empirical degree of firm pay mobility, Figure 8 plots the mean future firm-
year FE as a function of the current firm-year FE quantile for a balanced and unweighted panel of
firms.14 Panel (a) plots a firm’s current firm-year FE in some year t on the horizontal axis against
its average firm-year FE in year t+ τ on the vertical axis, for τ = 1, 5, 10, 25. There is clear mean
reversion in firm pay levels. Firm pay on average increases among currently low-paying firms,
while it decreases among currently high-paying firms. Moreover, currently low-paying (high-
paying) firms are increasingly less likely to remain low-paying (high-paying) over increasing time
horizons. The magnitude of mean reversion is economically significant. The currently lowest-
paying firms on average increase their pay by 5, 10, 14, and 20 log points over the subsequent 1, 5,
10, and 25 years. The currently highest-paying firms on average decrease their pay by 12, 18, 23,
and 35 log points over the subsequent 1, 5, 10, and 25 years.
14Using a balanced and unweighted panel facilitates interpretation of these graphs. For unbalanced panels, mean
future pay ranks need not equal the mean due to firm entry and exit over time. For weighted panels, worker mobility
by itself could drive a wedge between future and current firm pay ranks.
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Panel (b) of Figure 8 plots a firm’s current rank in the firm-year FE distribution in some year
t on the horizontal axis against its average rank in the analogous distribution in year t+ τ on the
vertical axis, for τ = 1, 5, 10, 25. If firm pay were fixed over time, as is assumed in the classical
AKM framework, all colored lines would collapse to the 45-degree line. Instead, we clearly see
firms that are currently below the 55th percentile of the firm pay ladder on average gain ranks,
while firms that are currently above that percentile on average lose ranks. Moreover, this pattern
becomes more pronounced with the lag length. Firms ranked near the bottom of the current firm
pay distribution on average gain around 4, 9, 12, and 22 percentile ranks in a time span of 1, 5,
10, and 25 years. Firms ranked near the top of the current firm pay distribution on average lose
around 8, 14, 19, and 35 percentile ranks in a time span of 1, 5, 10, and 25 years.
Figure 8. Mean mobility in firm-year FEs
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Note: Figure shows the mean future level (panel (a)) and percentile ranks (panel (b)) of firm-year FEs conditional on the current
firm-year fixed effect at various lag lengths. Source: LISA, RAMS.
Firm pay mobility is not a uniform phenomenon. Instead, similarly ranked firms experience
different mobility patterns. Figure 9 plots various percentiles of the distribution of firm pay lev-
els and ranks after 1 year (panels (a)–(b)), 5 years (panels (c)–(d)), 10 years (panels (e)–(f)), and
25 years (panels (g)–(h)) conditional on current firm pay rank. Several points are worth noting.
First, median mobility in levels and ranks is close to zero at short time horizons, but significant,
especially in the tails of the distribution, at longer horizons. Second, there is significant dispersion
in future firm pay levels and ranks conditional on current firm pay at all lag lengths, as measured
by the P90-P10 differential of the conditional distribution of future ranks. Third, this dispersion in
future firm pay levels and ranks increases with the time horizon.
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Figure 9. Percentiles of mobility in firm-year FEs
(a) Levels, 1-year difference
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(b) Ranks, 1-year difference
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(c) Levels, 5-year difference
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(d) Ranks, 5-year difference
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(e) Levels, 10-year difference
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(f) Ranks, 10-year difference
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(g) Levels, 25-year difference
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(h) Ranks, 25-year difference
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Note: Figure shows various percentiles of future levels (panels (a), (c), (e), and (g)) and percentile ranks (panels (b), (d), (f), and
(h)) of the firm-level mean earnings distribution conditional on the current firm-year fixed effect at various lag lengths. Source: LISA,
RAMS.
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A direct and intuitive summary index of firm pay mobility is the rank correlation in firm-
year FEs from some year t to some future year t+ τ, which is a statistic commonly used in other
contexts (Bourguignon et al., 1991; Kopczuk et al., 2010; Chetty et al., 2014). Table 4 shows the
empirical rank correlations in firm-year FEs for τ = 1, 5, 10, 25 for unbalanced versus balanced
and unweighted versus weighted firm panels. The rank correlation at a lag length of 1 year ranges
from 0.834 to 0.930. To provide some context, these numbers are comparable to Kopczuk et al.
(2010)’s estimates of 1-year rank correlations of around 0.900 in individual earnings in U.S. Social
Security data from 1986 to 2003. Balanced and weighted rank correlation tend to be higher than
the unbalanced and unweighted ones, indicating more stability in pay among large incumbent
firms. The rank correlation declines to 0.717–0.828 at a lag length of 5 years, to 0.627–0.731 at a
lag length if 10 years, and to 0.346–0.376 at a lag length of 25 years. Again, to put these numbers
into context, Kopczuk et al. (2010) report comparable 20-year rank correlations of around 0.494 in
individual earnings in the U.S. from 1978 to 1998.15
Table 4. Rank correlations for firm-year FEs at various lag lengths
Unbalanced Balanced
Lag length Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
1 0.834 0.885 0.878 0.930
5 0.717 0.792 0757 0.828
10 0.627 0.708 0.660 0.731
25 0.355 0.346 0.376 0.367
Note: Table shows rank correlations for firm-year FEs at various lag lengths for unbalanced vs. balanced, and unweighted vs.
weighted panels of firms. Source: LISA, RAMS.
To highlight the value added of our firm-year FE methodology, we repeat our mobility exer-
cises using raw data on firm-level mean earnings, the results of which are shown in Figures 22–23
of Appendix C.3. Relative to what the unadjusted raw data suggests, we find greater degrees of
mobility in firm pay using our firm-year FE methodology. Furthermore, the additional mobility
picked up by our firm-year FE estimates is unlikely to be attributable solely to measurement error
since the increase in mobility going from 1-year to 25-year lag lengths is significantly larger than
15We also compute the Shorrocks mobility index (Shorrocks, 1978) based on the variance of firm-year FEs over the
period 1986–2015 to be 0.396. The Shorrocks mobility index, M, is defined as
M = 1−
Varjt
(
ψ̂j
)
∑
T
t=1 Varj
(
ψ̂jt
)
/T
: ψ̂j ≡
T
∑
t=1
ψ̂jt/T
We borrow this definition from Kopczuk et al. (2010) who do not compute the Shorrocks mobility index over individual
earnings for periods longer than five years or based on the variance of logs using U.S. Social Security data.
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that in the raw data.
4.4 Ex-Ante versus Ex-Post Firm Pay Heterogeneity
In light of the above evidence on firm pay mobility, a natural question is to what extent higher
paying firms are born so versus become so over time? To the extent that some firms are high
paying already from the start, what accounts for this initial pay heterogeneity? To the extent that
some firms become high paying over time, what accounts for these pay dynamics?
A long literature on individual income dynamics (MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989;
Guvenen, 2009; Guvenen and Smith, 2014), recently also applied to firm size dynamics (Sterk et al.,
2018), demonstrates that the autocovariance structure of earnings (firm size) contains important
information about the nature of ex-ante heterogeneity versus ex-post shocks facing individuals
(firms). We adapt this framework to understand the nature of firm pay dynamics.
Firm pay heterogeneity at firm entry. A firm’s capacity or willingness to pay its workers may be
correlated with firm age, for example due to firm life-cycle changes in credit constraints, produc-
tivity, and market power. Furthermore, the distribution of firm pay may not just shift uniformly
over firm age but instead change shape due to ex-post heterogeneity affecting some firms more
than others. To understand the relative importance of ex-ante versus ex-post heterogeneity, we
first investigate the distribution of pay at newly established firms.16
Figure 10 compares the distribution of pay at newly established firms to that of all firms in
the economy. Panel (a) compares estimated firm-year FEs between the two groups. It is visually
evident that new firms have lower mean pay, more mass in the left tail of the distribution, and less
mass in the middle of the distribution relative to all firms in the economy. Panel (b) makes clear
that new firms have excess mass in the lower 30 percentiles and lack mass particularly between
the 50th and 80th percentiles of the economy-wide distribution of firm pay.17
16Since new firms tend to be small (Haltiwanger et al., 2013), for robustness we repeated all exercises in this section
without any minimum firm size threshold. The results without any minimum firm size threshold, shown in Figures
24–28 in Appendix C.4 are qualitatively very similar.
17Figure 25 in Appendix C.4 further splits the group of "all firms" into different age groups. It shows that most of the
differences in the firm pay distribution are between new firms and those age 5 and above.
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Figure 10. Distribution of firm-year FEs at new firms versus all firms
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Note: Figure shows nonparametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the distribution of firm-year FEs for new firms com-
pared to all firms (a) and the distribution of firm-year FE population ranks for new firms compared to all firms (b). Source: LISA,
RAMS.
Figure 11 compares the firm pay distributions of different firm cohorts. While new firms are
on average lower paying than all firms (as demonstrated by Figure 10), panel (a) shows significant
variation between cohorts in their initial pay. Overall, between 1990 and 2015, new firm cohorts
have seen declining average firm pay but an increase in the variance and skewness of firm pay.
Panel (b) shows that between 1990 and 2015 there has been a marked increase in mass of firm pay
in the lower 20 percentiles and a decrease in mass above the median, measured in relation to the
population of all firms.
Figure 11. Distribution of firm-year FEs by firm cohort
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Note: Figure shows nonparametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the distribution of firm-year FEs for new firms from
various cohorts (a) and the distribution of firm-year FE population ranks for new firms from various cohorts (b). Source: LISA, RAMS.
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Next, we filter average firm-year FEs among new firms at business-cycle frequency, and show
their cyclical component relative to three business cycle indicators in Figure 12.18 It is important to
note that since firm-year fixed effects are already de-meaned every year, any fluctuations in mean
pay of new firms reflect excess volatility of new firms relative to the population of all firms in a
given year. Panel (a) shows a correlation of 0.355 between the cyclical component of firm-year pay
and that of the composite of the unemployment rate between 1986–2015. Put differently, mean pay
at new firms is procyclical (or, rather, more procyclical than economy-wide mean firm pay), that
is, higher during economic expansions than during contractions (again, relative to economy-wide
firm pay). Panels (b) and (c) of the same figure also show a positive correlation between mean pay
at new firms and two other business cycle indicators, namely the cyclical component of real GDP
(panel (b), correlation of 0.193) and that of real GDP per capita (panel (c), correlation of 0.181).
Statistical model. To jointly study the relative contributions of ex-ante and ex-post heterogeneity
towards firm pay differences, we leverage an insight from a long literature on individual income
dynamics (MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989; Guvenen, 2009; Guvenen and Smith, 2014),
recently also applied to firm size dynamics (Sterk et al., 2018), in inspecting the autocorrelation
function of firm pay. Specifically, we treat our estimates of firm-year FEs as data on which we
estimate the following statistical model for ψjt:
ψjt = ξ j + ujt + ε jt (4)
The first term, ξ j, in equation (4) is a permanent component that captures permanent differences
in pay across firms and drawn at time of inception of the firm from some distribution with finite
mean µ and variance σ2ξ :
ξ j ∼ iid
(
µ, σ2ξ
)
(5)
The second term, ujt, is a persistent firm pay component, which follows a first-order autore-
18To extract business-cycle frequency statistics, we use the HP filter with smoothing parameter λ = 6.25, as recom-
mended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
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Figure 12. HP-filtered cyclicality of mean firm-year FE of new cohort
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Note: Mean firm-year FE is relative to population of all firms, which is mean zero in each year. Cyclical components are extracted from
the annual time series using an HP filter with smoothing parameter λ = 6.25, as recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Source:
LISA, RAMS, IMF WEO.
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gressive process with autocorrelation ρ ∈ (0, 1) and finite variance of iid innovations, σ2ν :
ujt = ρujt−1 + νjt, νjt ∼ iid
(
0, σ2ν
)
(6)
The third term, ε jt, is a purely transitory firm pay component, which is iid with normalized
mean zero and finite variance σ2ε :
ε jt ∼ iid
(
0, σ2ε
)
(7)
Given this assumed structure for firm pay dynamics, the autocovariance matrix provides use-
ful information to identify the underlying parameters of the statistical model. In particular, the
autocovariance of firm pay between firm age a and firm age a + t, that is at lag length t ≥ 0, is
summarized by the following autocovariance function:19
C (a, a+ t) ≡ Cov
(
ψja,ψja+t
)
= σ2ξ + ρ
t
a
∑
i=0
ρ2iσ2ν + 1 [t = 0] σ
2
ε , (8)
where 1 [t = 0] is an indicator function for the lag length t being zero. Hence, the covariances
can be expressed as the function of four objects: the variance of the permanent component, σ2i ,
the variance of innovations to the persistent component, σ2ν , the autocorrelation of the persistent
component, ρ, and the variance of the temporary component, σ2ε . Provided a set of at least four au-
tocovariances, one would hence in general expect to be able to recover the underlying parameters.
We do so by method of moments estimation.
Figure 13 summarizes the autocovariance structure of firm pay.20 The top left panel plots the
standard deviation of firm pay for firms between age 1 and age 19, while the right panel graphs
the autocorrelation of firm pay. In particular, the line labeled a graphs the autocorrelation between
the firm-year FE at age a, ψˆja, and that h years later, ψˆja+h, for a set of initial ages a = 1, 2, . . . , 10.
The bottom two panels repeat the exercise for a balanced panel of firms. Firm selection contributes
to modest compression in firm pay dispersion as firms age. To a first-order, however, dispersion
in firm pay does not change much with firm age. Three observations are noteworthy with respect
19This can be seen by substituting backwards towrite firm pay at time a+ t as the discounted sum of past innovations.
20Although differing in their setting and methodology, our estimated autocorrelations (autocovariances) are com-
parable to those in Lachowska et al. (2019) using wage data from the US state of Washington and the leave-one-out
estimator developed by Kline et al. (2019b).
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to the autocorrelation. First, it falls rapidly between year a and year a+ 1, suggesting that the firm
component of pay has a transitory component. Second, it continues to decline as the time horizon
widens, although at a slower pace, consistent with the effects of a persistent component gradually
dissipating. Third, it appears to level off at a strictly positive value, indicating the presence of a
permanent component. That is, some firms consistently pay more.
Figure 13. Standard deviation and autocorrelation of firm pay, unbalanced & balanced panels
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Note: Figure shows estimates of the standard deviation (panels (a) and (c)) and the autocorrelation function (panels (b) and (d))
at various lag lengths and for various birth firm cohorts, both for an unbalanced worker-weighted panel of firms (panels (a) and (b))
and for an unbalanced worker-weighted panel of firms (panels (c) and (d)). Source: LISA, RAMS.
The left panel of Table 5 presents the estimated values for the statistical process in equation
(4) based on the autocovariance structure of firm pay for the balanced (unbalanced) panel.21 The
21Figure 29 in Appendix C.4 suggests that the estimated parameters in Table 5 are globally well-identified. In partic-
ular, the criterion minimum distance function is steep around its minimum in all four cases, although particularly so
for the standard deviation of the permanent component and the autocorrelation and somewhat less so for the standard
deviation of the idiosyncratic component.
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standard deviation of the permanent component equals 0.118 (0.181), confirming the intuition
based on Figure 13 that permanent heterogeneity across firms plays an important role behind
cross-sectional dispersion in firm pay. The standard deviation of innovations to the persistent
component equals 0.054 (0.095) and the autocorrelation is 0.914 (0.669). These estimates imply
that as a cohort of firms ages, the cross-sectional dispersion of the persistent component limits to
σ2ν/(1− ρ
2) = 0.018 (0.016). Hence, while the balanced and unbalanced panels differ in terms of
the estimated persistence of the persistent component, they provide a similar answer in terms of
the relative importance of the persistent component in the long-run. Finally, the variance of the
fully transitory component is 0.08 (0.06).
Table 5. Parameter estimates of statistical process for firm pay
Parameter estimates Share of long-run variance
ρ σξ σν σε Permanent Persistent Transitory
balanced 0.914 0.118 0.054 0.084 0.360 0.458 0.182
unbalanced 0.669 0.181 0.095 0.060 0.622 0.310 0.068
Note: Table shows parameter estimates of the statistical model in equations (4)–(7) for an unbalanced and balanced employment-
weighted panel of firms. Source: LISA, RAMS.
We are now ready to quantify the contribution of permanent, persistent, and transitory hetero-
geneity towards empirical firm pay dispersion. To this end, we take the limit of the autocovariance
function in equation (8) for t = 0 as a → ∞ to obtain an expression for the asymptotic variance of
firm pay:
lim
a→∞
C (a, a) = lim
a→∞
Var
(
ψja
)
= σ2ξ +
σ2ν
1− ρ2
+ σ2ε (9)
Combining equation (9) with the parameter estimates in Table 5, we find that in a balanced (un-
balanced) panel of old firms, permanent heterogeneity accounts for approximately 36 (62) percent
of the overall cross-sectional variance of firm pay, persistent heterogeneity accounts for around 46
(31) percent, and transitory heterogeneity accounts for 18 (7) percent.
We conclude that—in contrast to the classical AKM framework, which assumes that firm pay
policies are fixed—between one third and two thirds of firm pay heterogeneity are permanent,
with persistent and transitory fluctuations in firm pay explaining the remainder.
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5 Conclusion
A key assumption shared by a large literature building on the seminal work by AKM is that firm
pay policies are fixed. In contrast, we propose and estimate an empirical model that accounts
for idiosyncratically time-varying firm pay policies. We validate our approach by showing that
firm-year pay variation is systematically related to firm financial performance.
Moving from time-invariant to time-varying firmpay policies represents an important paradigm
shift. Our approach sheds new light on the drivers of increasing dispersion in firm pay in Sweden,
a trend similar to that recently highlighted in other countries (Card et al., 2013b; Song et al., 2018).
We find that a substantial part of the increase over time is due to changing pay at incumbent firms
rather than purely driven by firm turnover. Furthermore, since firm pay is mean-reverting, cross-
sectional variance estimates on short panels tend to overestimate long-run inequality in firm pay.
We show that pay at newly established firms, relative to the population of all firms, is procyclical.
Finally, we estimate that between one third and two thirds of the long-run cross-sectional firm pay
dispersion is due to permanent firm heterogeneity.
Overall, our empirical findings suggest that dynamic firm heterogeneity is important for un-
derstanding the anatomy of pay differences across workers in the labor market. Future work,
especially theoretical models of worker and firm heterogeneity in the labor market, should be
consistent with these empirical findings. An interesting avenue for future research will be to ex-
plore the implications of our empirical findings for equilibrium worker mobility decisions, for
understanding the structural sources of firm pay dynamics, and for designing social insurance
policies.
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A Appendix: Data
A.1 Detailed dataset description
Worker demographics data (LISA). The LISA database contains annual data on all adults who
are registered in Sweden on December 31 of a given year. The variable list includes year of birth,
gender, years of education, field of study, municipality of residence, marital status, number and
age of children, and a unique, anonymized individual identifier. We aggregate years of education
into five categorical groups, roughly corresponding to the US equivalent of less than high school,
high school, some college, college, and postgraduate studies.
Employment register data (RAMS). The RAMS database contains information about all job
spells in Sweden since 1985, including gross annual earnings, start and end month of the employ-
ment spell, worker type (employee or self-employed), and some information on the employer,
including location and whether it is private or public (in the latter case distinguishing between
municipality, region or national government). These data are reported by firms on behalf of work-
ers to Swedish tax authorities for the purpose of tax collection. As such, they arguably suffer from
little measurement error. Through unique firm, establishment and individual identifiers, we are
able to link these spell data to characteristics of individuals and firms from the LISA and FEK.
Based on these data, we construct a measure of gross monthly earnings for each employment
spell in the sample, which we convert to real values using Sweden’s national consumer price
index. We also use these data to impute a measure of firm age, based on the year in which the
first individual appeared in the firm. As in many administrative data sets, firm and establishment
identifiers sometimes change for reasons such as changes in ownership, etc. We assign a consistent
firm and establishment ID by exploiting longitudinal information contained in worker flows.22
Firm financials data (FEK). The FEK database contains a rich set of annual income and balance
sheet data on firms and establishments. SCB has collected some form of these data since 1968.
Data since 1985 are made available for research purposes. Up to 1997, data were collected only
for the largest firms and a sample of smaller firms. Over the 1997–2002 period, coverage was
22For two employers with at least five employees, if a set of workers of size greater than than half of the workforce of
employer j in year t constitutes more than half of the workforce of employer j′ in year t+ 1, then we classify employers
j and j′ as the same firm.
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gradually expanded to cover the universe of private sector firms in Sweden.23
The data contain information about firms’ sector, revenues, input costs, compensation of em-
ployees, assets (long-term and short-term), liabilities (long-term and short-term), equity, invest-
ments, etc. Based on these data, we construct a measure of real value added per worker by sub-
tracting costs of intermediates from total sales, converting the difference to real values using the
national CPI, and dividing this by total annual firm employment. We similarly proceed to con-
struct real per-worker measures of assets, liabilities, equity and investment.
B Appendix: Measuring Firm-Year Pay Heterogeneity
B.1 Details of identification
In this section, we provide details of model identification discussed in Section 3.2 by formalization
the definition of a connected set in the context of both the original AKM model and our firm-year
FE model. To this end, let workers be indexed by i ∈ I , let firms be indexed by j ∈ J , and let
years be indexed by t ∈ T . Then let J : I × T → J denote the function identifying for each
worker i in year t their current employer j = J(i, t).
Definition of connected set in AKM framework. Given (I ,J , T , J(·)), consider the induced set
of transitions between physical firms given by
EAKM =
{
(j, j′) ∈ J 2
∣∣ ∃i ∈ I , ∃t, t′ ∈ T s.t. j = J(i, t) ∧ j′ = J(i, t′)} .
Now consider the (undirected) graph GAKM = (J , EAKM) consisting of the vertex set J and the
edge set EAKM. A connected set of firms are the vertices of a maximally connected subgraph of
GAKM. That is, the connected set of firms containing a given firm j ∈ J is given by
CAKMj =
⋃ {
C ⊆ J
∣∣ j ∈ C ∧ ∀(j′, j′′) ∈ C2 : ∃i ∈ I , ∃t′, t′′ ∈ T s.t. j′ = J(i, t′) ∧ j′′ = J(i, t′′)} .
23Data also exist at the level of establishments since 2004, but since both time coverage and the economic content of
these data are more limited, we focus on firms as the relevant employer concept.
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The connected set of worker-years containing a given worker-year (i, t) ∈ I × T is defined as
CAKMi,t =
{
(i′, t′) ∈ I × T
∣∣∣ J(i′, t′) ∈ CAKMJ(i,t)
}
.
Definition of connected set in firm-year FE framework. The definition of a connected set in the
firm-year FE framework proceeds analogously to that in the original AKM framework. Given
(I ,J , T , J(·)), consider the induced set of transitions between firm-years given by
E =
{
((j, t), (j′, t′)) ∈ (J × T )2
∣∣ ∃i ∈ I s.t. j = J(i, t) ∧ j′ = J(i, t′)} .
Now consider the (undirected) graph G = (J × T , E) consisting of the vertex set J × T and the
edge set E . A connected set of firms are the vertices of a maximally connected subgraph of G. That
is, the connected set of firms containing a given firm-year (j, t) ∈ J × T is given by
Cj,t =
⋃ {
C ⊆ J × T
∣∣ (j, t) ∈ C ∧ ∀((j′, t′), (j′′, t′′)) ∈ C2 : ∃i ∈ I s.t. j′ = J(i, t′) ∧ j′′ = J(i, t′′)} .
The connected set of worker-years containing a given worker-year (i, t) ∈ I × T is defined as
Ci,t =
{
(i′, t′) ∈ I × T
∣∣∣ (J(i′, t′), t′) ∈ CJ(i,t),t
}
.
Detailed illustrations. Figure 14 illustrates 5 cases of identification of connected sets in the firm-
year FE model with two periods (indexed t = 1, 2) and two firms (indexed A and B) with two
employees each (shown as circles). Panels (a) and (b) are reproduced from Figure 1 and discussed
in Section 3.1. The remaining panels show cases with firm entry and exit, and with worker entry
and exit.
Panel (c) illustrates the case of Firm B exiting after period 1 and Firm C appearing as a new en-
trant in period 2. At the same time, all workers from the exiting Firm B are observed transitioning
between periods to the entering Firm C. In this case, two connected sets are formed: one around
Firm A across periods, the other around Firm B in period 1 and Firm C in period 2. Indeed, this
case is isomorphic to that in panel (a) without firm entry or exit. The reason for this is that in the
firm-year FEmodel, “physical firms” change identity every year, so only the allocation of workers,
but not entry and exit of firms, is a meaningful distinction.
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Panel (d) illustrates the case of firm entry and exit as in panel (c) but with additional worker
mobility between Firm B in period 1 and Firm A in period 2 (and also mobility between Firm A
in period 1 and Firm C in period 2, although this is redundant). As a result, one connected set
is formed around all firm-years. For the same reason as in the previous paragraph, this case is
isomorphic to that in panel (b) without firm entry or exit.
When does a firm-year not form part of a larger connected set? The answer is: whenever it is
not connected through worker mobility to any other firm-years. Panel (e) illustrates such a case
with worker entry and exit (an analogous example could be constructed with firm entry and exit).
Firm B exists for both periods but no worker is observed switching from Firm B in period 1 to
any other firm in period 2, and similarly no worker is observed switching to Firm B in period 2
from any other firm in period 1. As a result, both Firm B in period and Firm B in period 2 are
disconnected from the rest of the economy, that is, they each lie in a singleton connected set.
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Figure 14. Illustrating identification of the connected set(s), details
(a) Two connected sets
t = 1 t = 2
Connected set 1
Connected set 2
Firm A
(t = 1)
Firm B
(t = 1)
Firm A
(t = 2)
Firm B
(t = 2)
(b) One connected set
t = 1 t = 2
Connected set
Firm A
(t = 1)
Firm B
(t = 1)
Firm A
(t = 2)
Firm B
(t = 2)
(c) Two connected sets with firm entry & exit
t = 1 t = 2
Connected set 1
Connected set 2
Firm A
(t = 1)
Firm B
(t = 1)
Firm A
(t = 2)
Firm C
(t = 2)
(d) Two connected sets with firm entry & exit
t = 1 t = 2
Connected set
Firm A
(t = 1)
Firm B
(t = 1)
Firm A
(t = 2)
Firm C
(t = 2)
(e) One connected set and two disconnected sets with
worker entry & exit
t = 1 t = 2
Connected set
Disconnected
Firm A
(t = 1)
Firm B
(t = 1)
Firm A
(t = 2)
Firm B
(t = 2)
Disconnected
Note: Solid rectangles represent firm-years, with firm A in blue and firm B in orange. Solid and hollow circles represent workers,
with worker 1 in solid blue, worker 2 in hollow blue, worker 3 in solid orange, and worker 4 in hollow orange. Vertical dashed lines
represent time, with period t = 1 to the left and period t = 2 to the right. Solid arrows represent worker transitions across firm-years.
Dashed rectangles represent the connected set(s) formed by worker transitions across firm-years.
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B.2 First-Stage Results for AKM Specification with Firm FE
Table 6. Variance decomposition based on firm FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Var
(
yijt
)
0.236 0.230 0.231 0.234 0.235
Var (α̂i) 0.121 0.120 0.125 0.130 0.131
Var
(
ψ̂j
)
0.032 0.021 0.016 0.013 0.013
Var (γt) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
Var
(
Xit β̂
)
0.025 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.019
2×∑Cov (·) 0.003 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.019
Var
(
ε̂ ijt
)
0.051 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.049
Corr
(
α̂i, ψ̂jt
)
0.056 0.134 0.169 0.181 0.182
Observations 21,145,007 18,425,427 15,091,142 11,313,701 9,392,584
Unique workers 3,056,376 2,801,551 2,437,724 1,959,034 1,685,029
Unique firms 411,361 112,262 33,754 8,303 3,656
Largest connected set 98.5% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
R2 0.782 0.779 0.783 0.788 0.790
Firm FE type Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Income concept Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Minimum firm size 1 5 15 50 100
Note: Variance decomposition is based on the following earnings equation: yijt = αi + ψj + γt + Xitβ + εijt. The resulting variance
decomposition is Var(yijt) = Var(α̂i) + Var(ψ̂j) + Var(γt) + Var(Xit β̂) + 2∑Cov(·) + Var(ε̂ijt). Largest connected set is stated in
terms of the fraction of worker-years. Source: LISA, RAMS.
B.3 Second stage regression for workers
In parallel to our analysis of firm-year pay policies, following the two-stage methodology in Al-
varez et al. (2018), we project the estimatedworker FE from our augmentedAKMequation (1) onto
observable worker characteristics. Specifically, we estimate the following second-stage regression
for individual i in year t:
α̂i = Wiγ + ωi, (10)
where α̂i is the estimated first-stage worker fixed effect,Wi is a vector of observable worker char-
acteristics, and ωi is a worker-level error term. In estimating equation (10), our interest will lie in
the coefficient estimate γ̂ on worker-level attributes.
Two main findings of this worker-level second-stage regression are presented in Figure 15.
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First, we find a strong relation between worker pay and education, suggesting that higher skill
groups are remunerated through permanently higher pay in the labor market, regardless of their
employer-year combination. Second, we find a weak relation between worker pay and average
worker age, suggesting that cohort effects on pay are relatively muted.
Figure 15. Second stage results: Estimated worker pay versus worker characteristics
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Note: Figure shows mean worker FE by education group (left) and for average worker age groups (right) based on firm-year FE
specification in equation (1). Source: LISA, RAMS, FEK.
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B.4 Further Details on Comparison of Firm Pay Measures
Figure 16. Comparison between firm FE, firm-year FE, and mean earnings (firm-year FE on
x-axis)
(a) Comparison of means
Mean earnings slope (s.e.) = 1.371 (0.021)
Firm FEs slope (s.e.) = 0.751 (0.012)
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(b) Comparison of percentiles
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Note: Figure shows binned scatter plots of mean firm pay measures with linear best fit lines (panel (a)) and of various percentiles of
the conditional distribution of firm pay measures (panel (b)) as a function of mean firm-year FE bins. Source: LISA, RAMS.
Figure 17. Comparison between firm FE, firm-year FE, and mean earnings (firm FE on x-axis)
(a) Comparison of means
Mean earnings slope (s.e.) = 1.531 (0.025)
Firm-year FEs slope (s.e.) = 1.009 (0.005)
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(b) Comparison of percentiles
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Note: Figure shows binned scatter plots of mean firm pay measures with linear best fit lines (panel (a)) and of various percentiles
of the conditional distribution of firm pay measures (panel (b)) as a function of mean firm FE bins. Source: LISA, RAMS.
42
C Appendix: Firm Pay Dynamics
C.1 Further Details on Firm Pay Distribution over Time
Figure 18. Evolution of firm-year FEs in an unbalanced and unweighted panel, 1986–2015
(a) Percentiles
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(b) Normalized percentiles
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Note: Figure shows various percentiles of the distribution of firm-year FEs in levels (panel (a)) and relative to the year 1986 (panel (b))
for an unbalanced and unweighted panel of firms. Source: LISA, RAMS.
Figure 19. Evolution of firm-year FEs in a balanced and weighted panel, 1986–2015
(a) Percentiles
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(b) Normalized percentiles
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Note: Figure shows various percentiles of the distribution of firm-year FEs in levels (panel (a)) and relative to the year 1986 (panel
(b)) for a balanced and employment-weighted panel of firms. Source: LISA, RAMS.
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Figure 20. Evolution of firm-year FEs in a balanced and unweighted panel, 1986–2015
(a) Percentiles
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(b) Normalized percentiles
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Note: Figure shows various percentiles of the distribution of firm-year FEs in levels (panel (a)) and relative to the year 1986 (panel
(b)) for a balanced and unweighted panel of firms. Source: LISA, RAMS.
C.2 Further Details on Distribution of Changes in Firm Pay
Figure 21. Distribution of differences in firm-level mean earnings at various lag lengths
(a) Density
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(b) Moments
Lag length Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis
1 -0.002 0.003 1.965 45.002
5 0.023 0.010 0.547 12.808
10 0.028 0.015 -0.133 7.642
25 0.073 0.033 0.121 4.432
Note: Figure shows nonparametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the distribution of the within-firm differences in firm-
level mean earnings at various lag lengths in panel (a) and moments of the distribution at various lag lengths in panel (b). Source:
LISA, RAMS.
44
C.3 Further Details on Firm Pay Mobility
Figure 22. Mean mobility in firm-level mean earnings
(a) Levels
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Note: Figure shows the mean future level (panel (a)) and percentile ranks (panel (b)) of firm-level mean earnings conditional on current
firm-level mean earnings at various lag lengths. Source: LISA, RAMS.
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Figure 23. Percentiles of mobility in firm-level mean earnings
(a) Levels, 1-year difference
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(b) Ranks, 1-year difference
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(c) Levels, 5-year difference
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(d) Ranks, 5-year difference
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(e) Levels, 10-year difference
-0.
9
-0.
6
-0.
3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
Per
cen
tile
s o
f fi
rm
-le
vel
 m
ean
 ea
rni
ngs
 in
 10
 ye
ars
-0.9 -0.6 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Current firm-level mean earnings
P10 P50 P90
(f) Ranks, 10-year difference
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Per
cen
tile
s o
f fi
rm
-le
vel
 m
ean
 ea
rni
ngs
 ra
nk 
in 
10 
yea
rs
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Current firm-level mean earnings rank
P10 P50 P90
(g) Levels, 25-year difference
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(h) Ranks, 25-year difference
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Note: Figure shows various percentiles of future levels (panels (a), (c), (e), and (g)) and percentile ranks (panels (b), (d), (f), and
(h)) of the firm-level mean earnings distribution conditional on the current firm-year fixed effect at various lag lengths. Source: LISA,
RAMS.
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C.4 Further Details on Ex-Ante versus Ex-Post Firm Pay Heterogeneity
Further Details on Firm Pay Heterogeneity at Firm Entry.
Figure 24. Distribution of firm-year FEs at new firms versus all firms (no firm size threshold)
(a) Levels
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Note: Figure shows nonparametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the distribution of firm-year FEs for new firms
compared to all firms (a) and the distribution of firm-year FE population ranks for new firms compared to all firms (b) without a
minimum firm size threshold. Source: LISA, RAMS.
Figure 25. Distribution of firm-year FEs by firm age
(a) Levels
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Note: Figure shows nonparametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the distribution of firm-year FEs for new firms from
various age groups (a) and the distribution of firm-year FE population ranks for new firms from various age groups (b). Source: LISA,
RAMS.
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Figure 26. Distribution of firm-year FEs by firm age (no firm size threshold)
(a) Levels
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(b) Ranks
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Note: Figure shows nonparametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the distribution of firm-year FEs for new firms from
various age groups (a) and the distribution of firm-year FE population ranks for new firms from various age groups (b). Source: LISA,
RAMS.
Figure 27. Distribution of firm-year FEs by firm cohort (no firm size threshold)
(a) Levels
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Note: Figure shows nonparametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the distribution of firm-year FEs for new firms from
various cohorts (a) and the distribution of firm-year FE population ranks for new firms from various cohorts (b). Source: LISA, RAMS.
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Figure 28. HP-filtered cyclicality of mean firm-year FE of new cohort (no firm size threshold)
(a) Cycles of (1 - unemployment rate)
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(b) Cycles of GDP
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(c) Cycles of GDP p.c.
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Note: Mean firm-year FE is relative to population of all firms, which is mean zero in each year. Cyclical components are extracted
from the annual time series using an HP filter with smoothing parameter λ = 6.25, as recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Source:
LISA, RAMS, IMF WEO.
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Further Details on Statistical Model.
Figure 29. Global Identification Diagnostics: Minimum Distance Function
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Note: Figure shows the GMMminimization problem’s criterion function (black solid line) around the optimum parameter values
(vertical red dashed line) for the standard deviation of the permanent component (top left), the standard deviation of the persistent
component (top right), the autocorrelation (bottom left), and the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component (bottom right).
Source: LISA, RAMS.
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